What is a Reasonable Hourly Rate for Awarding Attorney’s Fees in Miami? Answer: It’s Significantly Less Than New York

In a recent federal case in which rapper and producer Timbaland (aka Timothy Mosley) won summary judgment on a copyright infringement case, Magistrate Judge Torres made the interesting comment that the fees that would be awarded to Timbaland would not be “‘New York’ billing rates.”  Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, Case No. 09-21597, 23 (S.D. Fla. July 16, 2013).  When calculating fees, parties are awarded reasonable hourly rates in the prevailing market and, as was the holding in a previous opinion, the reasonable rates in Miami are not equivalent to those in New York.

So what is a reasonable hourly fee in Miami?  Although it varies from case to case, it is clearly less than the rate in New York.  In Hermosilla v. Coca-Cola Co., 10-21418-CIV, 2011 WL 9364952 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2011), the court reduced the hourly rate of partners at Holland & Knight, LLP to a “blended” $425 an hour, and associates to $225 an hour, for what it called a basic intellectual property and contract case.  The court held:

We find as an initial matter that many of the hourly rates requested by the H & K attorneys are excessive for the South Florida legal community for the types of legal services that were required in this case. See ACLU of Ga., 168 F.3d at 437–38; Norman, 835 F.2d at 1299. “Even if a party chooses to employ counsel of unusual skill and experience, the court awards only the fee necessary to secure reasonably competent counsel.”

Id. at *9.  The partner fees were reduced from as high as $680 an hour for a partner and $385 an hour for an associate.  The other partners’ and associates’ billing rates weren’t too far behind the leaders.  The Court in Hermosilla noted the prestigious credentials of the H&K attorneys, but pointed out that even in the most expensive legal jurisdiction, New York, the courts could not approve such rates.

Which brings us back to our most recent case.  Judge Torres merely warned the attorneys for  “Timbo the King” (as he’s been referred to by Jay-Z), that Miami is not New York when it comes to billing.  No fees have been awarded yet, but for those of you that are curious, we’ll keep you up to date when Timbaland’s attorneys submit their version of what is reasonable.  For those that stumbled upon this post for insight regarding the reasonable hourly rate in South Florida and Miami, here are some cases to get you started:

Tiara Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 697 F.Supp.2d 1349 (S.D.Fla.2010) (reducing hourly rates charged by premium New York law firm by 19 to 25 percent); Global Horizons Inc. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 2009 WL 855970 (S.D.Fla. Mar.31, 2009) (awarding discounted hourly rates for premium South Florida law firm of $300–475 per hour (partners); $185–310 (associates); and $160 (paralegals)); Red Bull GMBH v. Spacefuel Corp., No. 06–20948–Civ–Jordan/Torres (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2007) (awarding reduced blended hourly rates for premium Washington D.C. and South Florida law firm of $400 for partners and $250 for associates).

(H/T to SouthFloridaLawyers.blogspot.com)

Insurance Agents Are Not Liable for Attorney’s Fees Under Florida Statute Sec. 627.428

Underwood Anderson & Assoc., Inc. v. Lillo’s Italian Rest., Inc., (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)

An insurance agent appealed the trial court’s award of $100,000 in attorney’s fees to the insured under Fla. Stat. § 627.428(1) after a judgment for negligence procurement of a flood insurance policy in the insured’s favor, because, the agent claimed, he did not qualify as an insurer under the terms of the statute. The court agreed and held that the agent did not constitute an insurer under § 627.428(1) because he merely facilitated the insurance contract to which he was not a party.

Insurer’s Appeal Was Barred Because it Failed to Properly Preserve Appellate Issue in Court Below

Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Center, Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co. (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

In a county court action, a chiropractic center sued an insurance company for PIP benefits, resulting in a settlement. When the center moved for attorney’s fees, a dispute arose over whether the center knew about an order of dismissal that had been entered in the case. The court held a hearing on the center’s subsequent 1.540(b) motion to vacate the order of dismissal. The hearing was held, without objection, in an informal fashion and without the swearing of witnesses.

After the county court granted the 1.540(b) motion and awarded the center attorney’s fees, the insurer appealed. The insurer’s claim on appeal was that the county court had abused its discretion in finding (1) that the motion for attorney’s fees was timely and (2) that excusable neglect existed sufficient to support rule 1.540(b) relief. The one-judge appellate panel of the circuit court reversed the county court order on the ground that there had been incompetent record evidence, a ground different from those raised by the insurer.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals granted the center’s second-tier petition for writ of certiorari and quashed the appellate decision of the circuit court, explaining that the circuit court had improperly reversed the county court since its reversal had been improperly premised on an issue that was neither preserved in the county court nor raised on appeal.

An Insurer Acting as an Asignee Was Entitled to Collect Attorneys Fees From Second Insurer

Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Penn. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. (4th DCA 2013)

This case concerned a fee dispute between two insurance carriers: Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (“ILM”) and Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (“PLM”). Both provided CGL policies to a subcontractor that was named in a third-party complaint, but only ILM provided a defense. ILM settled the claim and received an assignment of the insured’s rights against PLM for its failure to defend and indemnify. ILM then sued PLM for breach of contract, declaratory relief, and equitable/contractual subrogation. The trial court entered summary judgment for ILM, awarding it compensatory damages and prejudgment interest. The court, however, denied ILM’s request for fees under section 627.428. On appeal, the fourth district reversed: “The fact that an insurer is the party seeking attorney’s fees under section 627.428 does not, by itself, preclude recovery. … As an assignee of the subcontractor’s claim, ILM fell within the class entitled to recover fees under the statute. To enforce its assigned rights, ILM had to file suit against PLM, and obtain a favorable judgment. This is all that section 627.428 requires.”

Insured Entitled to Attorney’s Fees For Cost of Improper Deduction of Depreciation by Insurer in Wind Damage Claim

Sunshine State Ins. Co. v. Davide  (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)

Underlying this case is a claim for wind damages pursuant to an insurance policy. The damages were submitted to appraisal, but based on the award’s wording, the insurer was unsure whether the award had already taken into account deductions for depreciation.

When the insurer was unable to receive clarification on this issue, it presumed that depreciation had not been factored in and thus deducted from the award the amount that it unilaterally concluded would be the amount of depreciation.  The insured then filed a complaint against the insurer for breach of contract, bad faith, and to confirm the appraisal award.

Then, after the insurer received a letter from the appraiser noting that depreciation had already been deducted, the insurer paid its insured the depreciation amount it had previously withheld. Multiple motions and pleadings ensued, including the insured’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs for having recovered the depreciation payment.

The trial court granted the motion and held an evidentiary hearing to determine the appropriate amount. The trial court, in a very detailed order, awarded 150 hours at $450.00 per hour plus a multiplier of 2.0 with costs and expert fees. The third district affirmed the order, declining to find an abuse of discretion particularly since the trial court had concluded that the 150 hours “were necessary and crucial to reaching the results that were obtained.”