Discovery Aimed at Producing Evidence of Physician’s Bias in Insurance Case Was Permissible

Steinger, Iscoe & Greene, P.A. & Washington v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

In this case, a law firm and its client petitioned the Fourth District for a writ of certiorari to quash a trial court order that compelled the firm to produce discovery pertaining to the firm’s relationship with treating physicians. The underlying case involved a claim against GEICO for uninsured motorist coverage and the order at issue required the claimant’s firm to produce (1) all records of payment by the firm to the four treating physicians who would be rendering expert opinions; (2) all “Letters of Protection” to those medical providers; and (3) all deposition and trial transcripts of those individuals or entities in the firm’s possession, provided, however, that the firm was able to redact the names of clients in cases that settled or where no lawsuit was filed.

The Fourth District began by noting that because the evidence code allows a party to attack a witness’s credibility based on bias, discovery aimed at producing evidence of a treating physician’s bias is permissible. It then acknowledged that Rule 1.280(b)(5)(A)(iii) limits financial bias discovery from retained experts, but emphasized that those limitations “cannot be used as a shield to prevent discovery of relevant information from a material witness—such as a treating physician.”

The court then balanced the need for the discovery against the burden placed upon the witnesses, concluding that:

“where there is a preliminary showing that the plaintiff was referred to the doctor by the lawyer (whether directly or through a third party) or vice versa, the defendant is entitled to discover information regarding the extent of the relationship between the law firm and the doctor. … Here, the law firm is not a party to the litigation and the record currently before us does not establish that the doctor in this situation has a financially beneficial relationship with the law firm. If there is such a relationship, past or present, the jury is entitled to know the extent of the financial connections between the doctor and the law firm. The existence of referral agreements is clearly a permissible ground for impeachment of a doctor.”

Because the Fourth District was unable to determine whether GEICO established the existence of a referral relationship between the health care providers and the law firm, it granted the petition and remanded the case:

“At the very least, the health care providers must provide financial bias discovery like that permitted by rule 1.280(b)(5)(A)(iii) as well as any history of referrals between the health care providers and the law firm. Beyond that, if GEICO can establish that the law firm or health care providers referred plaintiff to the other, more extensive financial bias discovery from both of them may be appropriate. Accordingly, the trial court should not have required the law firm to produce the discovery at issue, as it is premature at this point.”

Explore posts in the same categories: Discovery, Uninsured Motorist (UM)

Tags: Bias, Discovery

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